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This paper compares the Calvo model with a Taylor contracting model in the context of the 
Smets-Wouters (2003) Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. In the Taylor price 
setting model, we introduce firm-specific production factors and discuss how this assumption can 
help to reduce the estimated nominal price stickiness. Furthermore, we show that a Taylor 
contracting model with firm-specific capital and sticky wage and with a relatively short price contract 
length of four quarters is able to outperform, in terms of empirical fit, the standard Calvo model with 
homogeneous production factors and high nominal price stickiness. In order to obtain this result, we 
need very large real rigidities either in the form of a huge (constant) elasticity of substitution 
between goods or in the form of an elasticity of substitution that is endogenous and very sensitive to 
the relative price. 
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Following the theoretical work of Yun (1996) and Woodford (2003), the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (NKPC), relating in￿ ation to expected future in￿ ation and the marginal
cost, has become a popular tool for monetary policy analysis. Typically, the elasticity
of in￿ ation with respect to changes in the marginal cost is, however, estimated to be
very small (e.g. Gali and Gertler (1999), Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001) and
Sbordone (2002)). In models with constant-returns-to-scale technology, perfectly mobile
production factors and a constant elasticity of substitution between goods, such low
estimates imply an implausibly high degree of nominal price stickiness. For example,
Smets and Wouters (2003) ￿nd that, on average, nominal prices are not re-optimised for
more than two years. This is not in line with existing micro evidence that suggests that
on average prices are sticky for around six months to one year.1;2
In response to these ￿ndings, a number of papers have investigated whether the in-
troduction of additional real rigidities, such as frictions in the mobility of capital across
￿rms, can address this apparent mismatch between the macro and micro estimates of
the degree of nominal price stickiness. For example, Woodford (2005), Eichenbaum and
Fisher (2004) and Altig et al. (2005) show how the introduction of ￿rm-speci￿c capital
lowers the elasticity of prices with respect to the real marginal cost for a given degree
of price stickiness. This paper focuses on the same issue, but di⁄ers from the previous
analysis in a number of ways. In contrast to the above-mentioned papers that focus
on models with Calvo (1983) style sticky prices, we introduce ￿rm-speci￿c factors into
a general equilibrium model with overlapping price and wage contracts as in Taylor
(1980). The reason for using Taylor contracts is three-fold. First, the Calvo model has
the unattractive feature that at any time there are some ￿rms that have not adjusted
their price optimally for a very long time. In contrast, with Taylor contracts there
is a maximum contract length. Second, while the simple Calvo model is analytically
tractable, its derivation with ￿rm-speci￿c factors and endogenous capital accumulation
is non-trivial and can not be solved in closed form. This complicates the empirical esti-
mation of the full model. The assumption of Taylor contracts facilitates the estimation
of a fully-speci￿ed linearised Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model
which embeds the pricing decisions of monopolistically competitive price and wage set-
1See the evidence in Bils and Klenow (2004) for the US and Altissimo, Ehrmann and Smets (2005)
for a summary of the In￿ ation Persistence Network (IPN) evidence on price stickiness in the euro area.
2However, one should be careful with using the micro-evidence to interpret the macro estimates.
Because of indexation and a positive steady state in￿ ation rate, all prices change all the time. However,
only a small fraction of prices are set optimally. The alternative story for introducing a lagged in￿ ation
term in the Phillips curve based on the presence of rule-of-thumb price setters is more appealing from
this perspective, as it does not imply that all prices change all the time. In that case, the comparison
of the Calvo parameter with the micro evidence makes more sense. As the reduced form representations
are almost identical, one could still argue that the estimated Calvo parameter is implausibly high.
1ters and real rigidities such as ￿rm-speci￿c capital. Finally, the use of Taylor contracts in
this DSGE setting also makes it easier to analyse the distribution of prices and quantities
across the various sectors. This analysis is important to check whether the introduction
of real rigidities leads to a realistic distribution of prices and quantities (as in Altig et
al., 2005). Our paper is most closely related to Coenen and Levin (2004), which also
investigates the relative importance of real and nominal rigidities in a world with Taylor
contracts. However, Coenen and Levin (2004) focuses on Germany and does not specify
the full structural model. Finally, in contrast to most of the papers mentioned above,
our paper also analyzes the implications of ￿rm-speci￿c labour markets.
In the rest of this paper, we proceed in several steps. First, we compare the Calvo
and Taylor speci￿cation in an estimated DSGE model under the assumption that ￿rms
are price-takers in the factor markets, i.e. the labour and capital markets, and hence
all ￿rms face the same ￿ at marginal cost curve. We ￿nd that the length of the Taylor
contracts in the goods market needs to be extremely long (about ￿ve years) in order to
match the data as well as the Calvo scheme. Though striking, this result is consistent
with Dixon and Kara (2005a), who show how to compare the mean duration of contracts
in both time-dependent price setting models. In this section, we also show that the
standard way of introducing mark-up shocks in the Calvo model does not work very
well with Taylor-type price setting and we propose a di⁄erent way of introducing price
mark-up shocks.
Next, we re-estimate the Taylor contracting models with ￿rm-speci￿c capital and/or
￿rm-speci￿c labour and analyse the impact of these assumptions on the empirical per-
formance of the DSGE model and on the estimated contract length in the goods market.
Our main ￿ndings are twofold. First, in line with the previous literature we ￿nd that in-
troducing ￿rm-speci￿c capital does lead to a fall in the estimated Taylor contract length
in the goods market to a more reasonable length of 4 quarters. However, the elasticity
of substitution between goods of the various price-setting cohorts is estimated to be im-
probably high. Furthermore, the corresponding price mark-up is estimated to be smaller
than the ￿xed cost, implying negative pro￿ts in steady state. Enforcing a steady-state
zero-pro￿t condition leads to a signi￿cant deterioration of the empirical ￿t. At the same
time, the estimated elasticity of substitution remains very large. Moving from the tra-
ditional Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator towards Kimball￿ s (1995) generalized aggregator helps
to solve both problems. In that case, the curvature parameter is estimated to be high,
which is a sign that real rigidities are at work, but both the estimated elasticity of sub-
stitution and the cost of imposing the above-mentioned zero-pro￿t constraint are sharply
reduced. These results are in line with Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), Coenen and Levin
(2004) and Altig et al. (2005). In this context, we also investigate the implications of
the various models for the ￿rm-speci￿c supply and pricing decisions, which is easier to
perform in a Taylor-contracting framework.
2Finally, we also analyse the impact on empirical performance of introducing ￿rm-
speci￿c labour markets. Here the results are less promising in terms of reducing the
estimated degree of nominal price stickiness. The reason is that ￿rm-speci￿c labour
markets only dampen the price impact of a change in demand for a given degree of
nominal price stickiness, if the ￿rm-speci￿c labour markets are ￿ exible and the ￿rm-
speci￿c wage is responding strongly to changes in the demand for labour. Such wage
￿ exibility is, however, incompatible with the empirical properties of aggregate wage
behaviour.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we brie￿ y review the estimated
DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2005) with a special focus on the estimated degree
of price stickiness. Section 3 compares the Calvo model with the standard Taylor-
contracting model. Section 4 explores the impact of introducing ￿rm-speci￿c production
factors. The concluding remarks are in Section 5.
2 Calvo price-setting in a linearised DSGE model
In this Section, we brie￿ y describe the DSGE model that we estimate using euro area
data. For a discussion of the micro-foundations of the model we refer to Smets and
Wouters (2005). Next, we review the main estimation results with regard to the in￿ ation
equation embedded in the DSGE model.
2.1 The DSGE model
The DSGE model contains many frictions that a⁄ect both nominal and real decisions of
households and ￿rms. The model is based on Smets and Wouters (2004). Households
maximise a non-separable utility function with two arguments (goods and labour e⁄ort)
over an in￿nite life horizon. Consumption appears in the utility function relative to
a time-varying external habit variable. Labour is di⁄erentiated, so that there is some
monopoly power over wages, which results in an explicit wage equation and allows for
the introduction of sticky nominal wages ￿ la Calvo (1983). Households rent capital
services to ￿rms and decide how much capital to accumulate taking into account capital
adjustment costs.
The main focus of this paper is on the ￿rms￿price setting. A continuum of ￿rms
produce di⁄erentiated goods, decide on labour and capital inputs, and set prices. Fol-
lowing Calvo (1983), every period only a fraction (1 ￿ ￿p) of ￿rms in the monopolistic
competitive sector are allowed to re-optimise their price. This fraction is constant over
time. Moreover, those ￿rms that are not allowed to re-optimise, index their prices to
the past in￿ ation rate and the time-varying in￿ ation target of the central bank. An
additional important assumption is that all ￿rms are price takers in the factor markets
for labour and capital and thus face the same marginal cost. The marginal costs depend
3on wages, the rental rate of capital and productivity.
As shown in Smets and Wouters (2004), this leads to the following linearised in￿ation
equation:
b ￿t ￿ ￿t =
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Parameters ￿ and ￿ are respectively the capital share and the household￿ s psychological
discount factor. The deviation of in￿ ation b ￿t from the target in￿ ation rate ￿t depends
on past and expected future in￿ ation deviations and on the current marginal cost, which
itself is a function of the rental rate on capital b rk
t , the real wage b wt and the productivity
process, that is composed of a deterministic trend in labour e¢ ciency ￿t and a stochastic
component "a





t is an iid-Normal productivity shock. Finally, ￿
p
t is an iid-Normal
price mark-up shock.
When the degree of indexation to past in￿ ation is zero (￿p = 0 ), this equation reverts
to the standard purely forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve. In that case, all
prices are indexed to the in￿ ation objective so that announcements of changes in the
in￿ ation objective will be largely neutral even in the short run while the Phillips curve
will be vertical in the long run. With ￿p > 0, the degree of indexation to lagged in￿ ation
determines how backward looking the in￿ ation process is, i.e. how much structural
persistence there is in the in￿ ation process. The elasticity of in￿ ation with respect to
changes in the marginal cost depends mainly on the degree of price stickiness. When all
prices are ￿ exible (￿p = 0) and the price mark-up shock is zero, this equation reduces to
the normal condition that in a ￿ exible price economy the real marginal cost is constant.
Equation (1) yields a direct link between the elasticity of in￿ ation with respect to the
marginal cost and the Calvo parameter. A weak reaction of in￿ ation to the marginal cost
implies a very high Calvo parameter. Shocks that a⁄ect the marginal cost will in￿ uence
in￿ ation only gradually as a consequence of the high price stickiness. However, the
marginal cost is not directly observed and its de￿nition is therefore open to discussion.
It is clear from equation (1) that a smoother response of the marginal cost to shocks might
result in a lower estimate of price stickiness. As variable capital utilisation mitigates the
response of marginal cost to output ￿ uctuations, it should help obtaining a low Calvo
parameter. However, Smets and Wouters (2004) show that, empirically, this friction is
not very important once one allows for the other frictions that smooth marginal costs
such as nominal wage rigidities.3
3In the version of the model estimated in this paper, variable capital utilisation still appears but the
4The simple relation between the elasticity of in￿ ation with respect to the marginal
cost and the Calvo parameter, as appearing in equation (1), is only valid if all ￿rms are
producing at the same marginal cost. This will be the case if capital is mobile between
￿rms at each point in time and all ￿rms can hire labour at a given wage, determined
in the aggregate labour market. In this case, the capital-labour ratio will also be equal








The rest of the linearised DSGE model is summarised in the appendix. In sum, the
model determines nine endogenous variables: in￿ ation, the real wage, capital, the value
of capital, investment, consumption, the short-term nominal interest rate, the rental rate
on capital and hours worked. The stochastic behaviour of the system of linear rational
expectations equations is driven by ten exogenous shock variables. Five shocks arise
from technology and preference parameters: the total factor productivity shock, the
investment-speci￿c technology shock, the preference shock, the labour supply shock and
the government spending shock. Those shocks are assumed to follow an autoregressive
process of order one. Three shocks can be interpreted as ￿cost-push￿shocks: the price
mark-up shock, the wage mark-up shock and the equity premium shock. Those are
assumed to follow a white-noise process. And, ￿nally, there are two monetary policy
shocks: a permanent in￿ ation target shock and a temporary interest rate shock.
2.2 Findings in the baseline model
The linearised DSGE model is estimated for the euro area using seven key macro-
economic time series: output, consumption, investment, employment, real wages, prices
and a short-term interest rate. The data are described in section 6.1 of the appendix.
The full information Bayesian estimation methodology used is extensively discussed in
Smets and Wouters (2003). Table 1 reports the estimates of the main parameters gov-
erning the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve and compares these estimates with those
obtained by Gali et al. (2001) which use single-equation GMM methods to estimate a
adjustment cost has been given a looser prior than in Smets and Wouters (2003) (cf. appendix). This
results in a much higher estimated adjustment cost. As a consequence the variable capacity utilisation
plays virtually no role in the model presented in this paper. This is not necessarily a bad thing since
allowing for a relatively insensitive marginal cost of changing the utilisation of capital substantially
reduces the impact of introducing ￿rm-speci￿c capital.
4It is important to note that in the empirical exercise wages are observed (in contrast to the rental
rate on capital) and as a result the response of wages to all types of shocks is restricted by the data. The
smoother the reaction of wages to the di⁄erent shocks the ￿ atter the marginal cost curve and the lower
will be the estimated price stickiness.
5similar equation on the same euro area data set.5
Let us very brie￿ y mention some results. First, the degree of indexation is rather
limited, implying a coe¢ cient on the lagged in￿ ation rate of 0.15. Second, the degree of
Calvo price stickiness is very large: each period 89 percent of the ￿rms do not re-optimise
their price setting. The average price contract is therefore lasting for more than 2 years.
This is implausibly high, but those results are very similar to the ones reported by Gali
et al. (2001). Our estimates generally fall in the range of estimates reported by Gali et
al. (2001), if they assume constant returns to scale as we do in our model (Table 1).
Table 1: Comparison of estimated Philipps-curve parameters
with Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (GGL, 2001)
SW GGL (2001) (1) GGL (2001) (2)
Structural parameters
￿p 0.89 (0.01) 0.90 (0.01) 0.92 (0.03)
￿p 0.18 (0.10) 0.02 (0.12) 0.33 (0.12)
A 9.1 10.0 12.5
Reduced-form parameters
￿f 0.84 0.87 (0.04) 0.68 (0.04)
￿b 0.15 0.02 (0.12) 0.27 (0.07)
￿ 0.013 0.018 (0.012) 0.006 (0.007)
Notes: The GGL (2001) estimates are those obtained under the assumption
of constant returns to labour under two alternative speci￿cations. Strictly
speaking, the structural parameters are not directly comparable as GGL
use the inclusion of rule-of-thumb price setters (rather than indexation)
as a way of introducing lagged in￿ ation. A stands for the average age of
price contracts in numbers of quarters; ￿f is the implied reduced-form
coe¢ cient on expected future in￿ ation; ￿b is the coe¢ cient on lagged inf-
lation and ￿ is the coe¢ cient on the real marginal cost.
Moreover, we display in a companion paper (de Walque, Smets and Wouters (2005))
that the degree of price stickiness is one of the most costly frictions to remove in terms of
5As there are many models estimated throughout the paper and since the Monte Carlo Markov Chain
sampling method used to derive the posterior distribution of the parameters is extremely demanding in
computer-time for such large scale models, the MCMC sampling algorithm has only been run for some
models (see Appendix 6.4). The parameters and standard errors reported in all Tables are the estimated
modes and their corresponding standard error. The log data density displayed is actually the Laplace
approximation. It is shown in appendix 6.4 that it is very close to the modi￿ed harmonic mean for the
models for which the latter has been computed.
6the empirical ￿t of the DSGE model. Indeed, reducing the Calvo probability of not re-
optimising from the estimated 89 percent to a more reasonable 75 percent corresponding
to contracts lasting since about 4 quarters reduces the log data density of the estimated
model drastically (by about 75). This feature perfectly illustrates the puzzle we face.
At the micro level, one observes that prices are re-optimised on average between every
6 month and one year, while at the macro level, in￿ ation is shown to be very persistent.
In the model with homogeneous production factors, in￿ ation persistence requires large
nominal price stickiness in contradiction with the micro observation.
3 Taylor versus Calvo-style price setting with mobile pro-
duction factors
In this section, we compare the empirical performance of the Taylor price-setting model
with the Calvo model discussed above, maintaining the assumption of mobile production
factors. One unattractive feature of the Calvo price setting model is that some ￿rms do
not re-optimise their prices for a very long time.6 As indicated by Wolman (2001), the
resulting misalignments due to relative price distortions may be very large and this may
have important welfare implications. The standard Taylor contracting model avoids this
problem.7 In this model ￿rms set prices for a ￿xed number of periods and price setting
is staggered over the duration of the contract, i.e. the number of ￿rms adjusting their
price is the same every period.8 The explicit modelling of the di⁄erent cohorts in the
Taylor model also facilitates the introduction of ￿rm-speci￿c capital and labour as no
aggregation across cohorts is required. It also has the advantage that the cohort-speci￿c
output and price levels are directly available, which is important for checking whether
the dispersion of output and prices across price-setting cohorts is realistic.
In order to be able to compare the Taylor price-setting model with the Calvo model
discussed above, we maintain the assumption of partial indexation to lagged in￿ ation and
the in￿ ation objective. As discussed in Whelan (2004) and Coenen and Levin (2004),
the staggered Taylor contracting model gives rise to the following linearised equations
6See, however, Levy and Young (2003) for an exception. The 5-nickel price of a bottle of Coca-Cola
has been ￿xed for a period of almost 80 years.
7Another alternative is the truncated Calvo model as analysed in Dotsey et al. (1999), Bakhshi et al.
(2003) and Murchinson et al. (2004).
8See Coenen and Levin (2004) and Dixon and Kara (2005b) for a generalisation of the standard Taylor
contracting model where di⁄erent ￿rms may set prices for di⁄erent lengths of time.
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t an i.i.d. shock. We experiment with two ways of introducing
the price mark-up shocks in the Taylor contracting model. The ￿rst method (d = 1), is
fully analogous with the Calvo model. We assume a time-varying mark-up in the optimal
price setting equation, which introduces a shock in the linearised price setting equation
(3) as shown above. The second method (d = 0) is somewhat more ad hoc. It consists
of introducing a shock in the aggregate price equation (4).9
Similarly, we introduce Taylor contracting in the wage setting process. This leads to
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b li;t+i = b lt+i ￿
1 + ￿w
￿w
[b wi;t+i + b pt ￿ (b wt+i + b pt+i)] (8)
where nw is the duration of the wage contract, ￿l represents the inverse elasticity of work
e⁄ort with respect to real wage, b lt is the labour demand described in (A6) (cf. model
appendix) and b li;t is the demand for the labour supplied at nominal wage b wi;t by the






t is an i.i.d. shock to the labour supply, ￿w is the
9This could be justi￿ed as a relative price shock to a ￿ exible-price sector that is not explicitly modelled.
Of course, such a shortcut ignores the general equilibrium implications (e.g. in terms of labour and capital
reallocations).
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Legend: bold black line: baseline (Calvo) model; full line: 20-quarter Taylor price contract;
dashed line: 10-quarter Taylor price contract; dotted line: 4-quarter Taylor price contract.






i.i.d. wage mark-up shock. Finally, ￿w is the wage mark-up. Note that as we did for
price shocks, wage shocks have been introduced in two di⁄erent ways.
Before discussing the estimation results, it is worth highlighting two issues. First,
Dixon and Kara (2005a) have argued that a proper comparison of the degree of price
stickiness in the Taylor and Calvo model should be based on the average age of the
running contracts, rather than on the average frequency of price changes. As is well
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Thus, in order to produce the same average contract age as the one implied by a Calvo
parameter ￿p, the Taylor contract length needs to be
1+￿p
1￿￿p periods. The Calvo parameter
￿p = 0:9 estimated in section 2 above, therefore implies a long Taylor contract length of
19 quarters.
Figure 1 con￿rms the Dixon and Kara (2005a) analysis by comparing the impulse
responses to respectively a productivity and a monetary policy shock in the baseline
Calvo model and 4, 10 and 20-quarter Taylor-contracting, keeping the other parameters
￿xed at those estimated for the baseline Calvo model. In this ￿gure the wage contract
length nw is ￿xed at four quarters. As the duration of the Taylor contract lengthens, the
impulse responses appear to approach the outcome under the Calvo model. One needs
a very long duration (about 20 quarters) in order to come close to the Calvo model.
With shorter Taylor contracts typically the in￿ ation response becomes larger in size,
but also less persistent. Conversely, the output and real wage responses are closer to
the ￿ exible price outcome. For example, in response to a monetary policy shock the
response of output is considerably smaller. Moreover, with shorter Taylor contracts the
in￿ ation response changes sign quite abruptly after the length of the contract. This
feature is absent in the Calvo speci￿cation. As discussed in Whelan (2004), in reduced-
form in￿ ation equations the reversal of the in￿ ation response after the contract length is
captured by a negative coe¢ cient on lagged in￿ ation once current and expected future
marginal costs are taken into account.
A second issue relates to the way in which the price shocks are introduced. As
shown in Figure 2, the two ways of introducing price (resp. wage) shocks discussed
above generate very di⁄erent short run dynamics in response to such shocks. The right-
hand column of Figure 2 shows that introducing a persistent shock in the GDP de￿ ator
10equation (i.e. d = 0) allows the Taylor-contracting model to mimic most closely the
response to a mark-up shock in the baseline Calvo speci￿cation.10
Figure 2: Impulse response to a price shock in the 20-quarter Taylor
model for di⁄erent speci￿cations of the price shock (baseline parameters)





























































1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
Legend: bold black line: baseline (Calvo) model; black line: 20-quarter Taylor contract
with persistent price shock; dashed black line: 20-quarter Taylor contract with i.i.d. price
shock.
10The same exercise could actually be run for a wage shock. Since it leads to similar conclusions we
do not reproduce it here.
11We now turn to the main estimation results. A number of results are worth high-
lighting. First, we con￿rm that, in line with the impulse responses shown in Figure
2, the speci￿cation with the persistent price shock in the GDP price equation (d=0)
does best in terms of empirical performance. For example, the log data density of the
estimated model with 10-quarter Taylor contracts improves by 90 points relative to the
speci￿cation with a persistent price shock in the optimal price setting equation. Similar
improvements are found for other contract lengths. Moreover, the empirical performance
also improves signi￿cantly by allowing for persistence in the price shocks.11
Second, as illustrated by Figure 3 which plots the log data density of the estimated
Taylor model as a function of the contract length, the contract length that maximises
the predictive performance of the Taylor model is 19 quarters. This again con￿rms
the analysis of Dixon and Kara (2005a) discussed above. Table 2 compares some of
the estimated parameters across various Taylor models and the Calvo model. While
most of the other parameters are estimated to be very similar, it is noteworthy that the
estimated degree of indexation rises quite signi￿cantly as the assumed Taylor contracts
become shorter. Possibly, this re￿ ects the need to overcome the negative dependence on
past in￿ ation in the standard Taylor contract.



























Legend: the black line represents the log data density in the baseline
Calvo model; black diamonds are for the Taylor model with mobile production
factors and a persistent price shock in the GDP price; white diamonds are for
the same model but with non-mobile capital, zero pro￿ts and endogenous
mark-up (see section 4.4 below).
11Similar ￿ndings have been found for various speci￿cations of the wage shock. For that reason, we
consider a persistent wage shock in the average wage equation for all the estimations performed in the
rest of the paper.
12Table 2: Comparing the Calvo model with Taylor contracting models
Calvo 4-Q Tayl. 8-Q Tayl. 10-Q Tayl. 19-Q Tayl.
Log data densities
-471.113 -495.566 -489.174 -485.483 -468.469
Selection of estimated parameter outcomes
￿a 0.991 0.980 0.982 0.962 0.983
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
￿a 0.653 0.615 0.682 0.619 0.622
(0.093) (0.068) (0.085) (0.076) (0.085)
￿p 0 0.995 0.995 0.912 0.934
(-) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.018)
￿p 0.207 0.406 0.323 0.277 0.229
(0.019) (0.030) (0.023) (0.020) (0.016)
￿w 0 0.973 0.966 0.881 0.955
(-) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012)
￿w 0.250 0.4386 0.453 0.461 0.454
(0.021) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.035)
￿w 0.388 0.313 0.397 0.351 0.460
(0.197) (0.166) (0.205) (0.206) (0.188)
￿p 0.178 0.859 0.463 0.436 0.273
(0.096) (0.150) (0.130) (0.116) (0.074)
A 9.1 Q 2.5 Q 4.5 Q 5.5 Q 10 Q
Note: ￿a, ￿p and ￿w are the persistency parameters associated to the productivity,
the price and the wage shock respectively; ￿a, ￿p and ￿w are the standard error of
the productivity, the price and the wage shock respectively; ￿w and ￿p are respec-
tively the wage and price indexation parameters; A is the average age of the price
contract.
4 Firm-speci￿c production factors and Taylor contracts
4.1 Modelling ￿rm-speci￿c factors
So far the model includes all kinds of adjustment costs such as those related to the ac-
cumulation of new capital, to changes in prices and wages and to changes in capacity
utilisation, but shifting capital or labour from one ￿rm to another is assumed to be
costless (see Danthine and Donaldson, 2002). The latter assumption is clearly not fully
realistic. In this section we instead assume that production factors are ￿rm-speci￿c, i.e.
the cost of moving them across ￿rms is extremely high. Although this is also an extreme
13assumption, it may be more realistic. The objective is to investigate the implications of
introducing this additional real rigidity on the estimated degree of nominal price sticki-
ness and the overall empirical performance of the Taylor contracting model. As shown in
Coenen and Levin (2004) for the Taylor model and Woodford (2003, 2005), Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2004) and Altig et al. (2005) for the Calvo model, the introduction of ￿rm-
speci￿c capital reduces the sensitivity of in￿ ation with respect to its driving variables.
Similarly, Woodford (2003, 2005) shows that ￿rm-speci￿c labour may also help reducing
price variations and may lead to higher in￿ ation persistence.
In the case of ￿rm-speci￿c factors, the key equations of the linearised model governing
the decision of a ￿rm belonging to the cohort j (with j 2 [1;np]) which re-optimises its































b pt(j ￿ i) + "
p
t (4b)
b st+i(j) = ￿b ￿t+i(j) + (1 ￿ ￿)b wt+i(j) ￿b "a
t+i ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿t (9)
b Yt+i(j) = b Yt+i ￿
1 + ￿p
￿p
(b pt+i(j) ￿ b pt+i) (10)















where b ￿t(j) is the "shadow rental rate of capital services",12 and ￿p is the price mark-up
so that
1+￿p
￿p is the elasticity of substitution between goods. The main di⁄erence with
equations (3) and (4) is that the introduction of ￿rm-speci￿c factors implies that ￿rms
no longer share the same marginal cost. Instead, a ￿rm￿ s marginal cost and its optimal
price will depend on the demand for its output. A higher demand for its output implies
that the ￿rm will have a higher demand for the ￿rm-speci￿c input factors, which in turn
will lead to a rise in the ￿rm-speci￿c wage costs and capital rental rate. Because this
demand will be a⁄ected by the pricing behavior of the ￿rm￿ s competitors, the optimal
price will also depend on the pricing decisions of the competitors.
12Indeed, we left aside the assumption of a rental market for capital services. Each ￿rm builds its own
capital stock. The "shadow rental rate" of capital services is the rental rate of capital services such that
the ￿rm would hire the same quantity of capital services in an economy with a market for capital services
as it does in the economy with ￿rm-speci￿c capital.
14The net e⁄ect of this interaction will be to dampen the price e⁄ects of various shocks.
Consider, for example, an unexpected demand expansion. Compared to the case of
homogenous marginal costs across ￿rms, the ￿rst price mover will increase its price by
less because everything else equal the associated fall in the relative demand for its goods
leads to a fall in its relative marginal cost. This, in turn, reduces the incentive to raise
prices. This relative marginal cost e⁄ect is absent when factors are mobile across ￿rms
and, as a result, ￿rms face the same marginal cost irrespective of their output levels.
From this example it is clear that the extent to which variations in ￿rm-speci￿c marginal
costs will reduce the amplitude of price variations will depend on the combination of two
elasticities: i) the elasticity of substitution between the goods produced by the ￿rm and
those produced by its competitors, which will govern how sensitive relative demand for a
￿rm￿ s goods is to changes in its relative price (see equation (4b)); ii) the elasticity of the
individual ￿rms￿marginal cost with respect to changes in the demand for its products
(see equation (4b)). With a Cobb-Douglas production function, the latter elasticity will
mainly depend on the elasticity of the supply of the factors with respect to changes in
the factor prices. In brief, the combination of a steep ￿rm-speci￿c marginal cost curve
and high demand elasticity will maximise the relative marginal cost e⁄ect and minimise
the price e⁄ects, thereby reducing the need for a high estimated degree of nominal price
stickiness.
Before turning to a quantitative analysis of these e⁄ects in the next sections, it is
worth examining in somewhat more detail the determinants of the partial derivatives in
equation (12) in each of the two factor markets (capital and labour). Consider ￿rst ￿rm-
speci￿c capital. Given the one-period time-to-build assumption in capital accumulation,
the ￿rm-speci￿c capital stock is given within the quarter. As a result, when the demand
faced by the ￿rm increases, production can only be adjusted by either increasing the
labour/capital ratio or by increasing the rate of capital utilisation. Both actions will
tend to increase the cost of capital services. It is, however, also clear that when the
￿rm can increase the utilisation of capital at a constant marginal cost, the e⁄ect of an
increase in demand on the cost of capital will be zero. In this case, the supply of capital
services is in￿nitely elastic at a rental price that equals the marginal cost of changing
capital utilisation and, as a result, the ￿rst elasticity in equation (12) will be zero. In the
estimations reported below, the marginal cost of changing capital utilisation is indeed
high, so that in e⁄ect there is nearly no possibility to change capital utilisation. Over
time, the ￿rm can adjust its capital stock subject to adjustment costs. This implies that
the ￿rm￿ s marginal cost depends on its capital stock, which itself depends on previous
pricing and investment decisions of the ￿rm. As a result, also the capital stock, the value
of capital and investment will be ￿rm-speci￿c. In the case of a Calvo model, Woodford
(2005) and Christiano (2004) show how the linearised model can still be solved in terms
of aggregate variables, without solving for the whole distribution of the capital stock
15over the di⁄erent ￿rms. This linearisation is however complicated and remains model
speci￿c. With staggered Taylor contracts, it is straightforward to model the cohorts of
￿rms characterised by the same price separately. The key linearised equations governing
the investment decision for a ￿rm belonging to the jth cohort are then:
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where b Kt(j), b It(j) and b Qt(j) are respectively the capital stock, investment and the
Tobin￿ s Q for each of the ￿rms belonging to the jth price setting cohort. Parameter ￿
is the depreciation rate of capital and ￿ is the shadow rental rate of capital discussed
above, so that ￿ = 1=(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿). Parameter ’ depends on the investment adjustment
cost function.13
Consider next ￿rm-speci￿c monopolistic competitive labour markets. In this case
each ￿rm requires a speci￿c type of labour which can not be used in other ￿rms. More-
over, within each ￿rm-speci￿c labour market, we allow for Taylor-type staggered wage
setting. The following linearised equations display how a worker belonging to the fth
wage setting cohort (with f 2 [1;nw]) optimises its wage in period t for the labour it
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(￿wb ￿t￿1￿q + (1 ￿ ￿w)￿t￿q) (7b)
13As in the baseline model, there are two aggregate investment shocks: "
I
t which is an investment
technology shock and ￿
Q
t which is meant to capture stochastic variations in the external ￿nance premium.
The ￿rst one is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with an iid-Normal error term and the second is
assumed to be iid-Normal distributed.
16b lt+i(f;j) = b lt+i(j) ￿
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(b wt+i(f;j) + b pt ￿ (b wt+i(j) + b pt+i)) (8b)
b lt(j) = ￿b wt(j) + (1 +  )b ￿t(j) + b Kt￿1(j) (A6b)
It directly appears from these equations that there is now a labour market for each cohort
of ￿rms. Contrarily to the homogeneous labour setting, the labour demand of (cohort
of) ￿rm(s) j (equation A6b) directly a⁄ects the optimal wage chosen by the worker f
(equation 5b) and consequently the cohort speci￿c average wage (6b). When ￿w = 0,
real wages do not depend on the lagged in￿ ation rate.14
Due to the staggered wage setting it is not so simple to see how changes in the demand
for the ￿rm￿ s output will a⁄ect the ￿rm-speci￿c wage cost (equation (12)). A number
of intuitive statements can, however, be made. First, higher wage stickiness as captured
by the length of the typical wage contract will tend to reduce the response of wages to
demand. As a result, high wage stickiness is likely to reduce the impact of ￿rm-speci￿c
labour markets on the estimated degree of nominal price stickiness. In contrast, with
￿ exible wages, the relative wage e⁄ect may be quite substantial, contributing to large
changes in relative marginal cost of the ￿rm and thereby dampening the relative price
e⁄ects discussed above. Second, this e⁄ect is likely to be larger the higher the demand
elasticity of labour (as captured by a lower labour market mark-up parameter) and the
higher the elasticity of labour supply. Concerning the latter, if labour supply is in￿nitely
elastic, wages will again tend to be very sticky and as a result relative wage costs will
not respond very much to changes in relative demand even in the case of ￿rm-speci￿c
labour markets.
4.2 Alternative models
In this section we illustrate the discussion above by displaying how the output, the
marginal cost and the price of the ￿rst price-setting cohort respond to a monetary policy
shock. We compare the benchmark model with mobile production factors (hereafter
denoted MKL) with the following three models:
￿ a model with homogeneous capital and ￿rm-speci￿c labour market (hereafter de-
noted NML)
￿ a model with ￿rm-speci￿c capital, homogeneous labour (hereafter denoted NMK)
￿ a model with ￿rm-speci￿c capital and labour (hereafter denoted NMKL)
Moreover, for each of those models we consider four cases corresponding to ￿ exible and
sticky wages and low (0.01) and high (0.05) mark-ups in the goods market.15 Figure
14Parameter   is the inverse of the elasticity of the capital utilisation cost function.
15This corresponds to demand elasticities of 21 and 101 respectively. The latter is the one estimated
by Altig et al. (2005). Furthermore, one needs rather high substitution elasticities to observe signi￿cant
174 shows the responses of the cohort that is allowed to change its price in the period of
the monetary policy shock. In this Figure we assume that the length of the price and
wage contracts is 4 quarters. The rest of the parameters are those estimated for the
benchmark Taylor model (MKL) with the corresponding contract length. Responses are
displayed for the ￿rst 10 quarters following the shock, i.e. prices are re-optimised three
times by the considered cohort in the time span considered, at periods 1, 5 and 9.
Several points are worth noting. First, introducing ￿rm-speci￿c factors always re-
duces the initial impact on prices and output, while it increases the impact on the
marginal cost. As discussed above, with ￿rm-speci￿c production factors, price-setting
￿rms internalise that large price responses lead to large variations in marginal costs
and therefore lower their initial price response. Second, the introduction of ￿rm-speci￿c
factors increases the persistence of price changes in particular when wages are ￿ exible.
While in the case of mobile production factors with ￿ exible wages, the initial price de-
crease is partially reversed after four quarters, prices continue to decrease ￿ve and nine
quarters after the initial shock when factors are ￿rm-speci￿c. Third, in the case with
mobile factors, (MKL - bold black curve), it is clear that prices and marginal cost are
not a⁄ected by changes in the demand elasticity, while the ￿rm￿ s output is very much
a⁄ected. On the contrary, for all the models with at least one non-mobile production
factor, price responses decrease while marginal cost variations increase with a higher
demand elasticity.
Finally, as long as wages are considered to be ￿ exible, ￿rm-speci￿c labour market is
the device that leads to the largest reactions in marginal cost. It is also worth to remark
that the combination of ￿rm-speci￿c labour market and ￿rm-speci￿c capital brings more
reaction in the marginal cost than the respective e⁄ect of each assumption separately.16
However, as soon as wages become sticky, ￿rm-speci￿c labour markets do not generate
much more variability in marginal cost. In this case, it is striking that the responses of
the NMK and NMKL models gets very close to each other.
di⁄erence between the homogeneous marginal cost model and its ￿rm-speci￿c production factors coun-
terparts. So, for demand elasticities below 10, there is nearly no di⁄erence between the the MKL model
and the NML, NMK and NMKL ones. This indicates again the importance of a very elastic demand
curve.
16This is actually much in line with the ￿ndings of Matheron (2005) in a Calvo price-￿ exible wage
setting with ￿rm-speci￿c capital and labour.
18Figure 4: The e⁄ect of a monetary policy shock on output, marginal
cost and price of the ￿rst cohort in the 3 considered models
output real marginal cost price
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Note: bold black curve: MKL; full curve: NMKL; dashed curve: NMK; dotted curve: NML
194.3 Estimation
In this section we re-estimate the model with ￿rm-speci￿c production factors to investi-
gate the e⁄ects on the empirical performance of the model. Sbordone (2002) and Gali et
al. (2001) show that considering capital as a ￿xed factor which cannot be moved across
￿rms does indeed reduce the estimated degree of nominal price stickiness in US data.
In particular, it reduces the implied duration of nominal contracts from an implausibly
high number of more than 2 years to a duration of typically less than a year. Altig et al.
(2005) reach the same conclusion in a richer setup where ￿rms endogenously determine
their capital stock. In this section, we extend this analysis to the case of ￿rm-speci￿c
labour markets and test whether similar results are obtained in the context of Taylor
contracts.
Table 3 reports the log data densities of the three models considered above and
their ￿ exible/sticky wages variants for various price contract lengths. A higher log data
density implies a better empirical ￿t in terms of the model￿ s one-step ahead prediction
performance.
Table 3: Log data densities for the three models considered and their variants
2-Q Taylor 4-Q Taylor 6-Q Taylor 8-Q Taylor
￿ exible wages
NML -520.21 -481.86 -492.87 -490.16
NMKL -484.92 -479.56 -481.87 -485.23
NMK -486.50 -480.68 -482.16 -481.97
sticky wages (4-quarter Taylor contract)
NML -512.50 -490.19 -484.72 -480.54
NMKL -484.46 -466.10 -475.80 -477.23
NMK -479.11 -464.92 -473.17 -474.30
The following ￿ndings are noteworthy. First, in almost all cases, the data prefer
the sticky wage over the ￿ exible wage version. This is not surprising as sticky wages
are better able to capture the empirical persistence in wage developments. In what
follows, we therefore focus on the sticky wage models. Second, with sticky wages the
data prefer the model with ￿rm-speci￿c capital, but mobile labour. The introduction
of ￿rm-speci￿c labour markets does not help the empirical ￿t of the model. The main
reason for this result is that, as argued before, in order for ￿rm-speci￿c labour markets
to help in explaining price and in￿ ation persistence one needs a strong response of wages
to changes in demand. But this is in contrast to the observed persistence in wage
20developments. On the other hand, as we do not observe the rental rate of capital, no
such empirical constraint is relevant for the introduction of ￿rm-speci￿c capital. Finally,
introducing ￿rm-speci￿c capital does indeed reduce the contract length that ￿ts the data
best. While the log data density is maximised at a contract length of 19 quarters in the
case of homogeneous production factors, it is maximised at only four quarters when
capital cannot move across ￿rms. This is clearly displayed on Figure 3 (even though for
a variant model with endogenous mark-up developed in section 4.4 below). As clari￿ed
by Engin and Kara (2005a), this is equivalent in terms of price duration to a Calvo
probability of not re-optimising equal to 0.6. This con￿rms the ￿ndings of Gali et al.
(2001) and Altig et al. (2005). Moreover, it turns out that the four-quarter Taylor
contracting model with ￿rm-speci￿c capital performs as good as the 19-quarter Taylor
contract model with mobile capital and slightly better than the baseline Calvo model.
Table 4: A selection of estimated parameters for the Taylor
contracts models with ￿rm-speci￿c capital (NMK)
2-Q Taylor 4-Q Taylor 6-Q Taylor 8-Q Taylor
￿p 0.216 0.225 0.232 0.230
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017)
￿p 0.997 0.979 0.863 0.802
(0.002) (0.029) (0.124) (0.085)
1 + ￿ 1.616 1.515 1.522 1.520
(0.093) (0.138) (0.111) (0.100)
￿p 0.0008 0.004 0.008 0.016
(0.0003) (0.0015) (0.003) (0.006)
￿p 0.067 0.093 0.149 0.220
(0.070) (0.077) (0.094) (0.102)
￿w 0.403 0.463 0.547 0.436
(0.195) (0.210) (0.232) (0.231)
Note: ￿p is the persistency parameter associated to the price shock;
￿p is the standard error of the price shock; ￿w and ￿p are respectively
the wage and price indexation parameters; ￿ is the share of the ￿xed cost;
￿p is the price mark-up.
In line with these results, in the rest of the paper we will focus on the model with
￿rm-speci￿c capital, homogeneous labour and sticky wages. Table 4 presents a selection
of the parameters estimated for this model with various contract lengths. Note that,
in comparison to the case with homogeneous production factors, we also estimate the
elasticity of substitution between the goods of the various cohorts. A number of ￿ndings
21are worth noting. First, allowing for ￿rm-speci￿c capital leads to a drop in the estimated
degree of indexation to past in￿ ation in the goods sector. In comparison with results
displayed in Table 2, in this case the parameter drops back to the low level estimated for
the Calvo model and does not appear to be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Second, as
discussed in Coenen and Levin (2004), one advantage of the Taylor price setting is that
the price mark-up parameter is identi￿ed and therefore can be estimated. In contrast,
with Calvo price setting, the model with ￿rm-speci￿c factors is observationally equivalent
to its counterpart with homogeneous production factors. Table 4 shows that one needs
a very high elasticity of substitution (or a low mark-up) to match the Calvo model in
terms of empirical performance. It is also interesting to note that the estimated price
mark-up increases with the length of the price contract, showing the substitutability
between nominal and real rigidities. Finally, the persistence parameter of the price
shock signi￿cantly decreases with the length of the price contract.
For the 4-quarter price contract model, the estimated parameter for the price mark-
up is 0.004, which implies an extremely high elasticity of substitution of about 250.
This clearly indicates that one needs large real rigidities in order to compensate for
the reduction in price stickiness. However, this implies that the estimated ￿xed cost
in production (1 + ￿ stands at 1.515) very much exceeds the pro￿t margin, implying
negative pro￿ts in steady state.
In order to circumvent this problem, one may simply impose the zero pro￿t condition
in steady state. The estimation result obtained for the 4-quarter price contract model is
displayed in the ￿rst column of Table 5. The empirical cost of imposing the constraint is
rather high, about 15 in log data density. Furthermore, the estimated demand elasticity
remains very high at about 167. Note also that the constraint leads to a much larger
estimation of the standard error of the productivity shock.
4.4 Endogenous price mark-up
Following Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), and Coenen and Levin (2004), we can consider
a model with an endogenous mark-up, whereby the optimal mark-up is a function of
the relative price as in Kimball (1995). Replacing the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator by the
homogeneous-degree-one aggregator considered by Kimball (1995), the linearised optimal





























22where ￿ represents the deviation from the steady state demand elasticity following a

















This elasticity plays the same role as the elasticity of substitution: the larger it is, the
less the optimal price is sensitive to changes in the marginal cost. In this sense, having
￿ > 0 can help to reduce the estimate for the demand elasticity to a more realistic level.
Figure 5: Assessing the substitutability between the steady state demand
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Legend: bold black line: estimated 4 quarter NMK model with ￿xed mark-up;
black line: ￿p = 0:5 and ￿ = 20 ; gray line: ￿p = 0:5 and ￿ = 60.
17Of course, the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator corresponds to the case where ￿ is equal to zero.
23In order to illustrate this mechanism, Figure 5 displays the reactions of global output,
in￿ ation, wage and interest rate after a monetary policy shock for a model with an
endogenous price mark-up. As benchmark, we use the 4-quarter price contract model
with constant price mark-up estimated in Table 4 and we compare it with the model
integrating both the zero-pro￿t constraint and the endogenous price mark-up. For the
latter model, we use the parameters estimated for the benchmark, except for the steady
state mark-up, ￿p, which is ￿xed at 0.5, while di⁄erent values are used for the curvature
parameter ￿: 20 and 60. It is clear from Figure 5 that an endogenous price mark-up
which is very sensitive to the relative price can produce the same e⁄ect on aggregate
variables as a very small constant price mark-up.
Table 5: Estimated models with constrained and/or endo-
genous demand elasticity (some selected parameters)
￿ = ￿p and ￿ = 0 ￿ = ￿p and ￿ 6= 0














Note: ￿a and ￿p are the persistency parameter associated to the
productivity and the price shock respectively; ￿a and ￿p are the
standard error of the productivity and the price shock respectively; ￿w
and ￿p are respectively the wage and price indexation parameters;
￿ is the share of the ￿xed cost; ￿p and ￿w are respectively the price
and the wage mark-up; ￿ is the curvature parameter.
24The next step is to re-estimate the NMK model with 4-quarter price and wage Taylor
contracts but adding the modi￿cations discussed above, i.e. imposing the price mark-up
to equate the share of the ￿xed cost (￿ = ￿p) and allowing ￿ to be di⁄erent from zero.
The results are displayed in column 2 of Table 5. When the share of the ￿xed cost
is forced to equate the mark-up, shifting from a ￿nal good production function with a
constant price mark-up to one with a price mark-up declining in the relative price, the
estimated steady state price mark-up becomes much larger, implying a demand elasticity
of about 3. This helps to reduce the cost of the constraint and the log data density is
improved by 11. The very high estimated curvature parameter ￿ (about 70) reveals the
need for real rigidities.
4.5 Comparing models
Based on the log data density of the estimated models, we are not able to discriminate
between the model with homogeneous capital and very long price contracts and the
model with ￿rm-speci￿c capital, endogenous mark-up and short price contracts. We are
then somewhat in the same position as Altig et al. (2005) who have to compare two
models that are observationally equivalent from a macroeconomic point of view. These
authors reject the model with homogeneous capital for two reasons. First, it implies a
price stickiness not in line with micro evidence and second, it generates too high volatility
in cohort-speci￿c output shares. In this section we compare the various models in terms
of their implied behaviour of cohort-speci￿c output shares and relative prices. The latter
allows us to confront the models also with the micro evidence on ￿rms price setting which
￿nds that price changes are typically large.
Figure 6 compares the evolution of the output share (as a percentage deviation from
the steady-state) of the ￿rst four cohorts of ￿rms during the ￿rst four periods following
a monetary policy shock and the corresponding relative price changes. We run this
comparison for four models: (i) the 4-quarter Taylor contract model with non-mobile
capital and a high elasticity of substitution (Table 4 column 2), (ii) its variant with
constrained elasticity of substitution and endogenous mark-up (Table 5 column 2), (iii)
the 19-quarter Taylor contract model with mobile capital and an elasticity of substitution
equal to 250 and (iv) the same model with a substitution elasticity of 3.
25Figure 6: output shares and relative prices for the ￿rst 4 periods after
a monetary policy shock in homogeneous and ￿rm-speci￿c capital models
individual cohort output shares indiv. coh. rel. prices
19-quarter homogeneous capital model
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Legend: column from left to right are for cohort 1 to cohort 4. Column 5 is for
the ￿fteen cohorts that have not yet had the opportunity to re-optimise their price.
(*) see footnote 18
First, focusing on the evolution of the relative prices in these models, we observe
that relative prices vary much more across cohorts in the homogeneous factor model
than in the model with ￿rm-speci￿c capital.18 There are two reasons for such a higher
volatility: the fact that the marginal cost is independent of ￿rm-speci￿c output and the
length of the price contract which implies that only a small fraction of ￿rms can actually
change its price. The corollary of this high relative price variability is a much larger
variability in the market shares of ￿rms in the model with homogeneous capital and a
high substitution elasticity. In that case, the ￿rst cohort to reset optimally its price
nearly doubles its share in production. Even though this result is less extreme than the
one presented in Altig et al. (2005),19 such a high variability in output shares following a
18Note that the relative prices are displayed only for the model with ￿rm-speci￿c capital and endoge-
neous mark-up and for the model with mobile capital. Indeed, in the case of mobile capital, the relative
prices are not in￿ uenced by the subsitution elasticity. For the two models with ￿rm-speci￿c capital, the
numbers for relative prices are extremely close and showing them twice would prove redundant.
19In their model, with their erstimated parameters, at the fourth period after the monetary policy
shock, 57% of the ￿rms produce 180% of the global output, leaving the remaining ￿rms with a negative
26monetary policy shock is empirically implausible. However, reducing the huge elasticity
of substitution to the level consistent with a zero pro￿t condition, we observe that the
variability of the market share becomes quite small in both models, which weakens the
argument made by Altig et al. (2005) in favour of the model with ￿rm-speci￿c capital.
Furthermore, it is also clear from Figure 6 that the model with ￿rm-speci￿c capital fails
to reproduce the large price changes observed at the micro level.
To conclude this section, the introduction of ￿rm-speci￿c capital helps to reconcile
the macro models with the micro evidence concerning the frequency of the price changes.
However, the mechanism for this achievement is entirely based on a very strong reaction
of the marginal cost to output changes, which implies very small relative price varia-
tions. Such small relative price changes are incompatible with the micro evidence which
typically ￿nds that the average size of price changes is quite large.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced ￿rm-speci￿c production factors in a model with price
and wage Taylor contracts. For this type of exercise, Taylor contracts present a twofold
advantage over Calvo type contracts: (i) ￿rm-speci￿c production factors can be in-
troduced and handled explicitly and (ii) the individual ￿rm variables can be analysed
explicitly. This allows a comparison of the implications of the various assumptions con-
cerning the ￿rm-speci￿city of production factors not only for aggregate variables, but
also for cross-￿rm variability.
Our main results are threefold. First, in line with existing literature we show that
introducing ￿rm-speci￿c capital reduces the estimated duration of price contracts from
an implausible 19 quarters to an empirically more plausible 4 quarters. Firm-speci￿c
production factors makes the marginal costs of individual ￿rms steep and very reactive
to output changes. Since individual ￿rms output depends of their relative prices, ￿rms
will hesitate to make large price adjustments. Second, introducing ￿rm-speci￿c labour
markets does not help in improving the empirical performance of the model. The main
reason is that observed wages are sticky and therefore large variations in ￿rm-speci￿c
wages, which help in generating steep marginal costs, are empirically implausible. Over-
all, it thus appears that rigidities in the reallocation of capital across ￿rms rather than
rigidities in the labour market are a more plausible real friction for reducing the esti-
mated degree of nominal price stickiness. Third, in order to obtain this outcome one
needs a very high demand elasticity, implying implausibly large variations in the de-
mand faced by the ￿rms throughout the length of the contract. Imposing the zero-pro￿t
output.
27condition drastically reduces the estimated demand elasticity and leads to a correspond-
ing reduction in the volatility of output across ￿rms. However, in this case, the need
for important real rigidities becomes evident through a high estimated curvature of the
demand curve.
To compare the respective merits of the models with mobile production factors (￿ at
marginal cost) and ￿rm-speci￿c production factors (increasing marginal cost), it is im-
portant to remember what are the main ￿ndings emerging from micro data on ￿rms
pricing behaviour: price changes are at the same time frequent and large (cf. Bils and
Klenow, 2004, Angeloni et al. (2006)). The model with ￿ at marginal costs does lead
to large price changes, but requires a high degree of nominal stickiness to reproduce
in￿ ation persistence. The introduction of ￿rm-speci￿c marginal cost does lead to less
nominal stickiness, but implies small relative price variations across ￿rms. It thus seems
that, so far, neither models can simultaneously satisfy both stylized facts. Altig et al.
(2005) favour the model with ￿rm-speci￿c marginal cost on the basis of the argument
that it produces less extreme variations in output shares after an exogenous shock. We
have, however, shown that this outcome relies heavily on the price contract length and
on the very large demand elasticity. Introducing additional curvature in the demand
function as in Kimball (1995) signi￿cantly reduces the variability of output shares in the
model with ￿ at marginal costs. Overall, we therefore conclude that other elements such
as the presence of ￿rm-speci￿c shocks will have to be introduced to match all the im-
portant micro stylised facts. Further research on the relationship between prices, output
and marginal costs at the ￿rm level would be very useful in this respect.
Finally, note that in this paper and in contrast to Coenen and Levin (2004), we did not
allow for heterogeneity in the contract length. Such heterogeneity is another important
stylised fact of the micro data. Moreover, such heterogeneity could help explain the
tension between the ￿nding of macro persistence and micro ￿ exibility to the extent that
the presence of sectors with long price durations can have a disproportionately large e⁄ect
on the aggregate in￿ ation behaviour (cf. Dixon and Kara, 2005b). Further research along
these lines would be worthwhile.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Data appendix
All data are taken from the AWM database from the ECB (see Fagan et al., 2005).
Investment includes both private and public investment expenditures. The sample con-
tains data from 1970Q2 to 2002Q2 and the ￿rst 15 quarters are used to initialize the
Kalman ￿lter. Real variables are de￿ ated with their own de￿ ator. In￿ ation is calculated
as the ￿rst di⁄erence of the log GDP de￿ ator. In the absence of data on hours worked,
we use total employment data for the euro area. As explained in Smets and Wouters
(2003), we therefore use for the euro area model an auxiliary observation equation link-
ing labour services in the model and observed employment based on a Calvo mechanism
for the hiring decision of ￿rms. The series are updated for the most recent period us-
ing growth rates for the corresponding series published in the Monthly Bulletin of the
31ECB. Consumption, investment, GDP, wages and hours/employment are expressed in
100 times the log. The interest rate and in￿ ation rate are expressed on a quarterly basis
corresponding with their appearance in the model (in the graphs the series are translated
on an annual basis).
6.2 Model appendix
This appendix describes the other linearised equations of the Smets-Wouters model
(2003-2004).
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The real wage b wt is a function of expected and past real wages and the expected,
current and past in￿ ation rate where the relative weight depends on the degree of in-
dexation ￿w to lagged in￿ ation of the non-optimised wages. When ￿w = 0, real wages
do not depend on the lagged in￿ ation rate. There is a negative e⁄ect of the deviation
of the actual real wage from the wage that would prevail in a ￿ exible labour market.
The size of this e⁄ect will be greater, the smaller the degree of wage stickiness (￿w), the
lower the demand elasticity for labour (higher mark-up ￿w) and the lower the inverse
elasticity of labour supply (￿l ) or the ￿ atter the labour supply curve. "l
t is a preference
shock representing a shock to the labour supply and is assumed to follow a ￿rst-order
autoregressive process with an iid-Normal error term: "l
t = ￿l"l
t￿1 + ￿l
t. In contrast, ￿w
t
is assumed to be an iid-Normal wage mark-up shock.
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(b Rt ￿ Etb ￿t+1 + "b
t) (A2)
Consumption b ct depends on the ex-ante real interest rate (b Rt ￿ Etb ￿t+1) and, with
external habit formation, on a weighted average of past and expected future consumption.
When h = 0, only the traditional forward-looking term is maintained. In addition, due
to the non-separability of the utility function, consumption will also depend on expected
employment growth (Etb lt+1 ￿ b lt). When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
32(for constant labour) is smaller than one (￿c > 1 ), consumption and labour supply
are complements. Finally "b
t, represents a preference shock a⁄ecting the discount rate
that determines the intertemporal substitution decisions of households. This shock is















b Qt + "I
t (A3)
where ’ = S
00depends on the adjustment cost function (S) and ￿ is the discount factor
applied by the households. As discussed in CEE (2001), modelling the capital adjustment
costs as a function of the change in investment rather than its level introduces additional
dynamics in the investment equation, which is useful in capturing the hump-shaped
response of investment to various shocks including monetary policy shocks. A positive
shock to the investment-speci￿c technology, "I
t, increases investment in the same way as
an increase in the value of the existing capital stock b Qt. This investment shock is also





The corresponding Q equation is given by:
b Qt = ￿(b Rt ￿ b ￿t+1) +
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ + rkEt b Qt+1 +
rk




where ￿ stands for the depreciation rate and rk for the rental rate of capital so that
￿ = 1=(1￿￿ +rk). The current value of the capital stock depends negatively on the ex-
ante real interest rate, and positively on its expected future value and the expected rental
rate. The introduction of a shock to the required rate of return on equity investment,
￿
Q
t , is meant as a shortcut to capture changes in the cost of capital that may be due
to stochastic variations in the external ￿nance premium. We assume that this equity
premium shock follows an iid-Normal process. In a fully-￿ edged model, the production
of capital goods and the associated investment process could be modelled in a separate
sector. In such a case, imperfect information between the capital producing borrowers
and the ￿nancial intermediaries could give rise to a stochastic external ￿nance premium.
Here, we implicitly assume that the deviation between the two returns can be captured
by a stochastic shock, whereas the steady-state distortion due to such informational
frictions is zero.
The capital accumulation equation becomes a function not only of the ￿ ow of invest-
ment but also of the relative e¢ ciency of these investment expenditures as captured by
the investment-speci￿c technology shock:
b Kt = (1 ￿ ￿) b Kt￿1 + ￿ b It￿1 + ￿"I
t￿1 (A5)
33The equalisation of marginal cost implies that, for a given installed capital stock,
labour demand depends negatively on the real wage (with a unit elasticity) and positively
on the rental rate of capital:
b lt = ￿b wt + (1 +  )b rk
t + b Kt￿1 (A6)
where   =
 0(1)
 00(1) is the inverse of the elasticity of the capital utilisation cost function.
The goods market equilibrium condition can be written as:
b Yt = (1 ￿ ￿ky ￿ gy)b ct + ￿kyb It + gy"
g
t + +ky






￿( b Kt￿1 +  b rk
t ) + (1 ￿ ￿)(b lt + ￿t
i
￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿t (A7b)
where ky is the steady state capital-output ratio, gy the steady-state government spending-
output ratio and ￿ is one plus the share of the ￿xed cost in production. We assume that
the government spending shock follows a ￿rst-order autoregressive process with an iid-







Finally, the model is closed by adding the following empirical monetary policy reaction
function:
b Rt = ￿t + ￿(b Rt￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿)
h
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The monetary authorities follow a generalised Taylor rule by gradually responding
to deviations of lagged in￿ ation from an in￿ ation objective and the lagged output gap
de￿ned as the di⁄erence between actual and potential output. Consistently with the
DSGE model, potential output is de￿ned as the level of output that would prevail under
￿ exible price and wages in the absence of the three ￿cost-push￿shocks. The parameter
￿ captures the degree of interest rate smoothing. In addition, there is also a short-run
feedback from the current changes in in￿ ation and the output gap. Finally, we assume
that there are two monetary policy shocks: one is a temporary iid-Normal interest rate
shock (￿R
t ) also denoted a monetary policy shock; the other is a permanent shock to
the in￿ ation objective (￿t) which is assumed to follow a non-stationary process (￿t =
￿t￿1 + ￿￿
t ). The dynamic speci￿cation of the reaction function is such that changes in
the in￿ ation objective are immediately and without cost re￿ ected in actual in￿ ation and
the interest rate if there is no exogenous persistence in the in￿ ation process.
6.3 Description of the priors
Some parameters are ￿xed. They are principally parameters related to the steady-state
values of the state variables. The discount factor ￿ is calibrated at 0.99, corresponding
with an annual steady-state reel interest rate of 4%. The depreciation rate ￿ is set at
340.025, so that the annual capital depreciation is equal to 10 percent. The steady state
share of capital income is ￿xed at ￿ = 0:24:The share of steady-state consumption in
total output is assumed equal to 0.65 and the share of steady-state investment to 0.17.
The priors on the other parameters are displayed in tables of the next appendix. The
￿rst column is the description of the parameter, the second the prior distribution and the
two next columns give respectively the prior mean and standard error. Most of the priors
are the same as in Smets and Wouters (2003). However, an important di⁄erence is to note
for the capacity utilisation adjustment cost parameter ( ). Instead of estimating 1
  with
a prior [Normal 0.2 0.075], we now estimate cz =
 
1+  with a prior [beta 0.5 0.25], which
actually corresponds to a much looser prior since it allows for values of the elasticity of
the capital utilisation cost function between 0.1 and 10. Some new parameters appear:
the price and wage mark-ups, which are given a rather loose prior of [beta 0.25 0.15),
and the curvature parameter which is estimated via eps = ￿
1+￿ with a prior of [beta 0.85
0.1]. The latter allows for values of parameter ￿ between 1.5 and 100.
For the rest, as in Smets and Wouters (2003), the persistency parameters are given a
Normal prior distribution with a mean of 0.85 and a standard error of 0.10. The variance
of the shocks are assumed to follow an inverted Gamma distribution with two degrees of
freedom.
6.4 Parameter estimates for the main models
The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm has been run with 250 000 draws. Convergence is
assessed with the help of Cumsum graphs and using the Brooks and Gelman (1998)
uni-and multivariate tests performed by the Dynare software.
35Baseline Calvo model (Table 2 ￿rst column)
marginal likelihood :
Laplace approximation: -471.113
Modi￿ed harmonic mean: -470.407
Prior distribution Estimated posterior mode and mean Posterior sample based
type mean st. error mode st. error mean st. error 5% 10% 50% 90% 95%
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,654 0,094 0,672 0,098 0,533 0,556 0,661 0,802 0,848
inv. gamma 0,050 2 d.f. 0,109 0,014 0,113 0,015 0,090 0,095 0,113 0,132 0,138
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,194 0,044 0,215 0,051 0,147 0,158 0,207 0,282 0,311
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,346 0,023 0,350 0,023 0,315 0,322 0,349 0,380 0,389
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 1,846 0,499 1,985 0,510 1,285 1,394 1,913 2,675 2,925
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,228 0,046 0,232 0,049 0,163 0,175 0,226 0,295 0,319
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,142 0,018 0,144 0,017 0,118 0,123 0,144 0,166 0,174
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,564 0,052 0,565 0,058 0,471 0,491 0,563 0,639 0,663
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,207 0,019 0,211 0,020 0,182 0,188 0,210 0,236 0,245
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,249 0,021 0,255 0,024 0,218 0,226 0,254 0,287 0,297
beta 0,850 0,100 0,991 0,007 0,990 0,007 0,978 0,982 0,992 0,997 0,998
beta 0,850 0,100 0,890 0,020 0,896 0,023 0,856 0,866 0,897 0,924 0,931
beta 0,850 0,100 0,994 0,006 0,984 0,011 0,963 0,969 0,987 0,996 0,997
beta 0,850 0,100 0,979 0,008 0,978 0,009 0,963 0,967 0,979 0,989 0,991
beta 0,850 0,100 0,995 0,005 0,988 0,009 0,970 0,976 0,990 0,997 0,998
Normal 4,000 1,500 5,501 1,014 5,765 1,031 4,159 4,470 5,710 7,131 7,551
Normal 1,000 0,375 2,254 0,309 2,109 0,307 1,597 1,707 2,112 2,508 2,620
beta 0,700 0,100 0,483 0,053 0,502 0,051 0,419 0,438 0,502 0,567 0,585
Normal 2,000 0,750 1,323 0,869 1,397 0,700 0,393 0,518 1,331 2,353 2,655
beta 0,500 0,100 0,654 0,046 0,654 0,043 0,581 0,598 0,656 0,709 0,723
calvo wage beta 0,750 0,050 0,712 0,046 0,699 0,049 0,620 0,637 0,700 0,758 0,777
calvo price beta 0,750 0,050 0,891 0,014 0,890 0,012 0,870 0,874 0,889 0,905 0,910
beta 0,500 0,250 0,389 0,197 0,381 0,183 0,098 0,146 0,369 0,627 0,704
beta 0,500 0,250 0,178 0,096 0,184 0,087 0,052 0,075 0,177 0,303 0,339
beta 0,500 0,250 0,815 0,105 0,850 0,078 0,711 0,745 0,856 0,949 0,967
Normal 1,250 0,125 1,715 0,104 1,740 0,104 1,561 1,604 1,743 1,869 1,905
Normal 0,400 0,025 0,331 0,027 0,324 0,023 0,288 0,295 0,323 0,354 0,363
Normal 1,500 0,100 1,510 0,102 1,529 0,100 1,364 1,399 1,528 1,658 1,694
Normal 0,300 0,100 0,101 0,049 0,115 0,047 0,037 0,053 0,115 0,177 0,193
beta 0,750 0,050 0,901 0,017 0,895 0,018 0,863 0,871 0,896 0,918 0,924
beta 0,125 0,050 0,069 0,034 0,092 0,038 0,038 0,046 0,087 0,145 0,162
beta 0,063 0,050 0,127 0,034 0,132 0,034 0,078 0,090 0,130 0,176 0,191
r d(inflation)

































MK model, 19-quarter price contract (Table 2 last column)
marginal likelihood :
Laplace approximation: -468.469
Modi￿ed harmonic mean: -467.496
Prior distribution Estimated posterior mode and mean Posterior sample based
type mean st. error mode st. error mean st. error 5% 10% 50% 90% 95%
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,622 0,085 0,636 0,091 0,508 0,531 0,625 0,758 0,805
inv. gamma 0,050 2 d.f. 0,104 0,017 0,110 0,018 0,083 0,088 0,109 0,134 0,141
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,162 0,028 0,188 0,038 0,136 0,144 0,182 0,237 0,254
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,346 0,023 0,349 0,024 0,312 0,320 0,348 0,381 0,390
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,324 0,173 0,694 0,393 0,232 0,275 0,628 1,174 1,367
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,205 0,039 0,203 0,041 0,146 0,155 0,198 0,259 0,280
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,158 0,017 0,157 0,020 0,128 0,134 0,156 0,182 0,192
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,557 0,052 0,563 0,059 0,469 0,489 0,562 0,638 0,660
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,229 0,016 0,233 0,018 0,206 0,211 0,231 0,256 0,263
inv. gamma 0,250 2 d.f. 0,454 0,035 0,459 0,037 0,404 0,414 0,455 0,509 0,525
beta 0,850 0,100 0,983 0,006 0,981 0,007 0,969 0,972 0,982 0,990 0,992
beta 0,850 0,100 0,907 0,017 0,900 0,021 0,866 0,874 0,902 0,925 0,930
beta 0,850 0,100 0,990 0,009 0,983 0,010 0,963 0,968 0,985 0,995 0,997
beta 0,850 0,100 0,904 0,067 0,888 0,084 0,713 0,778 0,911 0,969 0,976
beta 0,850 0,100 0,993 0,005 0,983 0,015 0,947 0,965 0,987 0,995 0,996
beta 0,850 0,100 0,934 0,018 0,932 0,021 0,896 0,906 0,933 0,957 0,964
beta 0,850 0,100 0,955 0,013 0,950 0,017 0,917 0,928 0,953 0,968 0,972
Normal 4,000 1,500 6,543 1,032 6,396 1,036 4,736 5,084 6,364 7,770 8,155
Normal 1,000 0,375 2,085 0,274 1,986 0,282 1,522 1,622 1,992 2,337 2,450
beta 0,700 0,100 0,340 0,049 0,376 0,054 0,291 0,308 0,375 0,445 0,468
Normal 2,000 0,750 0,495 0,334 0,701 0,335 0,236 0,309 0,662 1,149 1,317
beta 0,500 0,100 0,645 0,043 0,639 0,042 0,568 0,585 0,640 0,692 0,707
beta 0,500 0,250 0,461 0,188 0,470 0,189 0,163 0,226 0,464 0,727 0,795
beta 0,500 0,250 0,273 0,074 0,274 0,078 0,146 0,173 0,276 0,372 0,398
beta 0,500 0,250 0,825 0,080 0,819 0,080 0,680 0,712 0,824 0,921 0,946
Normal 1,250 0,125 1,573 0,099 1,577 0,098 1,421 1,452 1,574 1,707 1,743
beta 0,250 0,150 0,206 0,123 0,279 0,124 0,105 0,132 0,264 0,445 0,512
Normal 0,400 0,025 0,394 0,023 0,391 0,022 0,354 0,362 0,390 0,419 0,427
Normal 1,500 0,100 1,562 0,084 1,575 0,082 1,443 1,470 1,574 1,683 1,714
Normal 0,300 0,100 0,197 0,046 0,200 0,048 0,123 0,139 0,199 0,263 0,281
beta 0,750 0,050 0,869 0,018 0,862 0,020 0,828 0,836 0,864 0,887 0,893
beta 0,125 0,050 0,094 0,026 0,101 0,028 0,058 0,066 0,099 0,139 0,151
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36NMK model, 4-quarter price contract, ￿ 6= ￿p and ￿ = 0 (Table 4 column 2)
marginal likelihood :
Laplace approximation: -464.920
Modi￿ed harmonic mean: -463.902
Prior distribution Estimated posterior mode and mean Posterior sample based
type mean st. error mode st. error mean st. error 5% 10% 50% 90% 95%
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.655 0.092 0.680 0.092 0.544 0.569 0.672 0.803 0.845
inv. gamma 0.050 2 d.f. 0.129 0.016 0.133 0.016 0.107 0.112 0.132 0.154 0.160
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.138 0.026 0.164 0.032 0.120 0.127 0.159 0.207 0.224
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.347 0.023 0.351 0.023 0.316 0.323 0.350 0.380 0.389
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.284 0.112 0.512 0.331 0.204 0.231 0.414 0.898 1.069
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.254 0.049 0.247 0.048 0.177 0.190 0.243 0.310 0.333
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.131 0.015 0.135 0.015 0.112 0.117 0.135 0.155 0.161
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.537 0.053 0.538 0.057 0.445 0.465 0.537 0.612 0.634
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.225 0.016 0.227 0.018 0.199 0.205 0.225 0.250 0.257
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.441 0.035 0.449 0.035 0.395 0.406 0.447 0.495 0.512
beta 0.850 0.100 0.979 0.009 0.979 0.008 0.964 0.968 0.979 0.988 0.990
beta 0.850 0.100 0.922 0.019 0.914 0.016 0.885 0.892 0.915 0.934 0.938
beta 0.850 0.100 0.992 0.009 0.984 0.010 0.965 0.971 0.986 0.995 0.997
beta 0.850 0.100 0.882 0.087 0.855 0.098 0.668 0.718 0.874 0.965 0.976
beta 0.850 0.100 0.997 0.003 0.991 0.007 0.977 0.982 0.993 0.998 0.999
beta 0.850 0.100 0.979 0.029 0.947 0.045 0.851 0.878 0.961 0.987 0.991
beta 0.850 0.100 0.959 0.011 0.954 0.014 0.929 0.937 0.956 0.970 0.974
Normal 4.000 1.500 6.261 1.029 6.221 1.025 4.620 4.930 6.177 7.585 7.986
Normal 1.000 0.375 2.083 0.285 1.956 0.282 1.485 1.594 1.960 2.311 2.413
beta 0.700 0.100 0.348 0.048 0.388 0.055 0.302 0.320 0.387 0.459 0.483
Normal 2.000 0.750 0.892 0.648 1.267 0.597 0.459 0.583 1.179 2.070 2.382
beta 0.500 0.100 0.650 0.043 0.650 0.038 0.585 0.602 0.652 0.698 0.709
beta 0.500 0.250 0.463 0.210 0.511 0.191 0.190 0.257 0.513 0.764 0.827
beta 0.500 0.250 0.093 0.077 0.113 0.065 0.024 0.035 0.103 0.201 0.233
beta 0.500 0.250 0.834 0.113 0.867 0.070 0.744 0.772 0.873 0.955 0.971
Normal 1.250 0.125 1.515 0.138 1.482 0.104 1.313 1.349 1.482 1.616 1.654
beta 0.250 0.150 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.007
beta 0.250 0.150 0.280 0.139 0.345 0.125 0.163 0.196 0.334 0.513 0.576
beta 0.850 0.100
Normal 0.400 0.025 0.398 0.023 0.400 0.023 0.364 0.371 0.400 0.429 0.437
Normal 1.500 0.100 1.536 0.083 1.556 0.081 1.429 1.454 1.553 1.661 1.695
Normal 0.300 0.100 0.172 0.045 0.183 0.046 0.107 0.124 0.183 0.242 0.259
beta 0.750 0.050 0.868 0.017 0.861 0.018 0.829 0.837 0.862 0.883 0.889
beta 0.125 0.050 0.114 0.027 0.106 0.027 0.066 0.074 0.104 0.142 0.153
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NMK model, 4-quarter price contract, ￿ = ￿p and ￿ 6= 0 (Table 5 column 2)
marginal likelihood :
Laplace approximation: -468.344
Modi￿ed harmonic mean: -467.130
Prior distribution Estimated posterior mode and mean Posterior sample based
type mean st. error mode st. error mean st. error 5% 10% 50% 90% 95%
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.650 0.088 0.659 0.089 0.528 0.552 0.651 0.778 0.820
inv. gamma 0.050 2 d.f. 0.130 0.017 0.130 0.017 0.102 0.108 0.129 0.152 0.159
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.144 0.024 0.168 0.033 0.124 0.132 0.163 0.211 0.229
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.347 0.023 0.350 0.023 0.314 0.321 0.349 0.380 0.389
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.286 0.115 0.511 0.289 0.205 0.234 0.420 0.934 1.125
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.250 0.048 0.249 0.051 0.177 0.189 0.243 0.316 0.342
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.130 0.015 0.137 0.016 0.112 0.117 0.136 0.158 0.165
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.538 0.054 0.536 0.057 0.442 0.463 0.535 0.608 0.628
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.178 0.013 0.184 0.014 0.162 0.166 0.183 0.202 0.207
inv. gamma 0.250 2 d.f. 0.437 0.033 0.448 0.035 0.395 0.406 0.446 0.493 0.507
beta 0.850 0.100 0.981 0.007 0.978 0.008 0.964 0.968 0.979 0.988 0.990
beta 0.850 0.100 0.917 0.013 0.912 0.017 0.882 0.890 0.913 0.931 0.936
beta 0.850 0.100 0.994 0.006 0.983 0.013 0.959 0.967 0.986 0.996 0.997
beta 0.850 0.100 0.892 0.093 0.850 0.101 0.656 0.707 0.870 0.963 0.975
beta 0.850 0.100 0.996 0.004 0.990 0.008 0.975 0.980 0.992 0.998 0.998
beta 0.850 0.100 0.539 0.056 0.544 0.060 0.443 0.467 0.547 0.617 0.639
beta 0.850 0.100 0.956 0.013 0.954 0.015 0.927 0.935 0.956 0.971 0.975
Normal 4.000 1.500 6.327 1.032 6.376 1.034 4.753 5.078 6.335 7.733 8.140
Normal 1.000 0.375 2.111 0.261 1.983 0.283 1.510 1.618 1.987 2.344 2.447
beta 0.700 0.100 0.356 0.049 0.388 0.053 0.303 0.321 0.386 0.458 0.480
Normal 2.000 0.750 1.124 0.614 1.250 0.578 0.440 0.565 1.178 2.033 2.313
beta 0.500 0.100 0.643 0.040 0.641 0.039 0.574 0.590 0.643 0.690 0.702
beta 0.500 0.250 0.562 0.210 0.533 0.193 0.205 0.274 0.537 0.788 0.846
beta 0.500 0.250 0.121 0.096 0.156 0.085 0.034 0.052 0.146 0.274 0.313
beta 0.500 0.250 0.812 0.080 0.844 0.073 0.719 0.747 0.848 0.938 0.958
Normal 1.250 0.125
beta 0.250 0.150 0.489 0.098 0.530 0.100 0.370 0.403 0.526 0.660 0.701
beta 0.250 0.150 0.288 0.117 0.332 0.122 0.152 0.184 0.319 0.495 0.551
beta 0.850 0.100 0.986 0.004 0.984 0.006 0.973 0.977 0.984 0.990 0.991
Normal 0.400 0.025 0.399 0.022 0.395 0.022 0.359 0.367 0.395 0.424 0.432
Normal 1.500 0.100 1.535 0.081 1.552 0.080 1.424 1.452 1.551 1.655 1.686
Normal 0.300 0.100 0.175 0.044 0.185 0.046 0.110 0.126 0.184 0.243 0.260
beta 0.750 0.050 0.866 0.017 0.862 0.018 0.830 0.838 0.863 0.884 0.890
beta 0.125 0.050 0.115 0.026 0.112 0.027 0.070 0.078 0.110 0.147 0.158
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